Financial Adviser: 5 Worst-Performing Stocks in the PSE in 2025 and How to Profit from Them

Price: 0.05  

Year-to-date loss: -91.07 percent

Cirtek Holdings Philippines Corporation (PSE: TECH) is a global semiconductor and wireless technology manufacturer engaged in outsourced assembly, test, packaging, and high-value electronics production. Through its subsidiaries, Cirtek provides turnkey semiconductor solutions and produces advanced RF, microwave, and antenna systems used in telecommunications, aerospace, defense, and automotive applications.

TECH operates two core businesses: Cirtek Electronics Corporation (CEC), which provides wafer probing, backgrinding, assembly, packaging, and final testing services; and Cirtek Advanced Technologies & Solutions (CATS), which manufactures integrated radio frequency, microwave, and millimeter-wave products.

The company also owns Quintel, a leading developer of high-efficiency base-station antennas acquired in 2017 to strengthen its position in the wireless communications market. Together, these operations create a vertically integrated technology platform serving global semiconductor and 5G network markets.

TECH’s 2024 financial statements reveal that the company is facing a deep liquidity strain driven primarily by a sharp collapse in revenues and cash generation. Total revenues fell significantly from USD 84.77 million in 2023 to USD 58.73 million in 2024 as major product categories experienced steep declines.

At the same time, sales to key regions weakened substantially: revenues from Asia plunged by more than half, from USD 27.05 million to USD 12.19 million, while Europe also declined. This broad-based weakness indicates that TECH’s customers cut orders across multiple segments due to softer market conditions in semiconductors, wireless communications, and electronics manufacturing.

The collapse in demand triggered a near-total fall in operating cash flow from $38.33 million in 2023 to only $2.73 million in 2024, which left the company unable to internally fund its obligations.

Cash on hand dropped from $36.70 million to just $12.79 million as the group continued to service heavy loan maturities. In 2024 alone, TECH had to settle nearly $20 million in current long-term loan amortizations, $6.78 million in short-term loan payments, and almost $3 million in interest expenses.

These outflows consumed most of the company’s remaining liquidity. At year-end, it held only $12.79 million in cash against $46.9 million in current liabilities, meaning its short-term obligations were nearly four times its available cash.

Compounding the situation, over $10 million was tied up in higher inventories and receivables, further restricting liquidity. The deterioration flowed through to the company’s equity position, with retained earnings swinging from a positive $5.5 million to a deficit of $0.38 million.

This year, TECH reported an 18 percent drop in net sales for the first nine months of 2025, driven by reduced revenue contributions from its three major units—CEC, CATSI, and Quintel

Although cost of sales decreased by 11 percent, this reduction was not enough to offset the revenue decline, resulting in a 54 percent drop in income before tax compared to the same period in 2024.

TECH’s operating expenses fell 15 percent, but overall earnings continued to contract, with net income for nine months down to $2.224 million, compared to $5.119 million for full-year 2024.

TECH’s cash and cash equivalents fell by 47 percent as loan payments and financial obligations continued to pressure cash flow. The current ratio dropped from 4.23x in 2024 to 3.04x in 2025, signaling tighter working capital conditions.

TECH actually has three preferred share series and all of them are now facing the same problem where the company can no longer legally or financially pay dividends on any of them.

The first two series, TCB2A and TCB2D, were issued earlier at six percent and seven percent annual dividends, respectively, both priced at P100 per share and structured as perpetual, non-voting instruments that TECH could redeem at its option.

Later on, Cirtek issued a third series known in the market as TCB2C which carries an even higher fixed dividend rate at around 7.5 percent and the same perpetual structure.

In theory, these preferred shares provided stable quarterly dividends to investors and long-term funding to the company. In practice, however, TECH’s financial condition deteriorated to the point where dividend payments became impossible.

By the end of 2024, the company had already slipped into a retained earnings deficit and suffered a drastic decline in operating cash flow. The company held only $12.79 million in cash against $46.9 million in short-term liabilities.

Based on nine-month 2025 financials, the company continued to deteriorate. Revenues fell further while cash reserves declined again and loan obligations remained heavy, which confirm that the liquidity strain persisted well into the following year.

Under Philippine corporate law, a company cannot declare dividends, common or preferred, if it has negative retained earnings, impaired capital, or insufficient liquidity to meet its obligations as they fall due. The 2025 interim results reinforce that Cirtek still fails all these requirements, making dividend payments impossible at this time.

Because all three Cirtek preferred share series require positive retained earnings and unrestricted cash before dividends can be declared, the company is legally barred from making any payments.

As a result, dividends for TCB2A, TCB2D, and TCB2C are all in arrears, and TECH cannot resume payments unless it reverses its retained earnings deficit and restores its liquidity.

Because of these financial strains, the market value of TECH’s three preferred share series collapsed. TCB2A plunged by 91.07 percent, TCB2D fell by 81.84 percent, and TCB2C declined by 71.8 percent, reflecting investors’ growing concern over TECH’s ability to resume dividend payments and restore its financial health.

Unless a major change occurs, such as an improvement in global demand, the entry of a strategic investor, or the sale of assets, the company will continue operating under tight financial pressure.

If the downtrend continues, TECH may eventually need to restructure its debt, renegotiate loan terms, or consider other measures to stay afloat. While this does not automatically point to bankruptcy, it does signal that preferred shareholders should not expect dividend payments to resume soon.

Cirtek’s preferred shares may look attractive at first glance because they trade at extremely steep discounts, but the financial reality behind them makes them high-risk instruments that should be avoided for now.

Because preferred dividends are cumulative but not enforceable, investors cannot compel TECH to pay. The dividends can remain suspended for many years with no legal consequence to the company.

This structural risk is the main reason why the preferred share prices have collapsed by 70 to 90 percent because the market no longer believes the dividends will return soon.

While distressed investors sometimes speculate on a long-shot turnaround, this requires a major improvement in revenues, a significant equity injection, or a restructuring—none of which are visible today.

Given these factors, TECH’s preferred shares are not suitable for conservative or income-focused investors, and even speculative investors face a high probability of prolonged non-payment with no guarantee of recovery.

Price: 0.144 

Year to date loss: -73.3 percent

PH Resorts Group Holdings, Inc. (PSE: PHR) is the holding company for the Udenna Group’s integrated tourism and gaming developments in the Philippines. The company focuses on acquiring, developing, and managing hotel, leisure, and casino properties through its subsidiaries.

PHR operates through PH Travel and Leisure Holdings Corp., with assets spanning major resort destinations. Its flagship project is Emerald Bay, an integrated tourism resort in Punta Engaño, Mactan Island, Cebu. It was planned to feature a five-star hotel with approximately 311 rooms, a gaming floor with around 600 electronic gaming machines and 122 gaming tables.

PHR’s difficulties began the moment it committed to building two massive integrated casino projects, Emerald Bay in Mactan, Cebu and The Base Resort Hotel & Casino in Clark, without having a stable revenue-generating operation to fund the construction.

For years, the company had no operating income, yet it continued to incur heavy construction costs, interest expenses, and operating overhead. As a result, PHR relied almost entirely on debt and advances from its parent company, Udenna Corporation, to sustain the projects.

By 2024, the company’s liquidity problems had become acute. PHR disclosed consistently negative operating cash flows and growing financial liabilities tied to the construction of Emerald Bay.

The group also defaulted on several obligations related to its P5.2-billion bridge loan with Chinabank, forcing it into a sale-and-leaseback (SLBB) arrangement. Under this agreement, the land and building improvements of the Emerald Bay site were transferred to Chinabank, while PH Resorts retained an option to repurchase the property. This transaction kept the project alive, but added over P6 billion in financial liabilities and exposed the company to strict deadlines.

By the end of 2024, the company’s problems deepened. Cash dropped to P18.76 million and losses continued to pile up, as borrowing costs rose. Most critically, the company faced a looming deadline: its repurchase right under the SLBB agreement would expire in March 2025.

In 2025, everything worsened. When the repurchase option expired on March 31, 2025, PHRs irrevocably lost control over the Emerald Bay Mactan property. This single event forced the company to derecognize P13.65 billion in assets, which include land and construction-in-progress and write off the related P8.75 billion in liabilities.

The resulting P7-billion loss became the largest expense in the company’s history. As a result, total assets collapsed from P19.47 billion to just P3.47 billion, bringing the group into capital deficiency of P5.93 billion and placing it in a position of technical insolvency.

PHR’s cash fell further to just P5.94 million by September 2025, barely enough for basic corporate operations. The only operating property left, the Donatela Resort in Panglao, generated only P22 million in nine-month revenue, far from sufficient to support the group’s expenses.

To raise even small amounts of cash, PHR sold a portion of its Bohol land for P55 million, mainly to pay interest on its Landbank loan.

With massive losses, shrinking assets, near-zero cash, and more liabilities than assets, PHR’s auditors explicitly raised a “material uncertainty” about the group’s ability to continue as a going concern.

The company now depends heavily on Udenna’s financial support while actively searching for strategic buyers or investors who can recapitalize the resorts.

Given the severity of PHR’s financial deterioration, the company’s future will largely depend on whether it can secure fresh capital or form a partnership that can rescue its stalled gaming and hotel projects.

With the loss of the Emerald Bay Mactan property in early 2025, the group now holds far fewer assets and is carrying a deep capital deficiency. The company cannot move forward on its own and is currently surviving mainly through the financial support of its parent, Udenna Corporation.

Because this support is limited and cannot sustain long-term development, PHR most realistic path to recovery is to bring in a strategic investor, someone capable of injecting large amounts of capital to recapitalize the business and stabilize the balance sheet.

Given the company’s current financial condition, PHR’s stock carries risks that far outweigh any speculative upside. The share price reflects a distressed situation, and without a confirmed investor or significant restructuring, there are no concrete catalysts that could drive a sustainable turnaround.

Any investment at this stage would amount to speculation on a future rescue rather than confidence in the company’s fundamentals. For most investors, it is more prudent to avoid the stock until PHR secures a solid capital partner. Only then would the risk profile meaningfully improve enough to reconsider its investment merits.

Price: P0.037 

Year to date loss -72.18 percent

AllDay Marts, Inc. (PSE: ALLDY) is a mid-premium supermarket chain under the Villar Group, offering a modern grocery experience through 40 stores nationwide and a fully integrated online platform.

Launched in 2016, AllDY operates about 60,000 sqm of selling space and carries around 25,000 SKUs, including a curated lineup of premium and imported goods. Its stores feature elevated concepts such as Paluto, Gastroville, self-checkout kiosks, and personal shopper services, positioning the brand above mass-market competitors.

In 2024, AllDY reported P9.25 billion in revenues, a 9.2 percent decline from P10.19 billion in 2023 as several stores faced intensified competition and weaker sales productivity. Gross margins held relatively steady, but softer vendor incentives and lower support income contributed to the overall slowdown.

Net income also declined, falling to P268 million, down 27.4 percent from the P369 million earned in the previous year. Despite the drop in both revenues and earnings, AllDY managed to remain profitable even in a more challenging retail environment.

For the first nine months of 2025, AllDY’s sales dropped sharply to P3.91 billion, a 44.9 percent decline from P7.09 billion in the same period of 2024. This represents a significant contraction in topline performance, with revenues nearly cut in half year-on-year.

The steep decline in sales translated into a much weaker bottom line. Net income turned into a net loss of P86.99 million for 9M 2025, compared to a profit of P224.21 million during the same period last year, a swing of P311 million. The reversal from profit to loss was driven by the sharp drop in gross profit, lower support income, and the inability of the current cost structure to absorb the reduced sales volume.

AllDY’s latest balance sheet shows that it is still solvent but is increasingly pressured by weakening liquidity. Total assets declined from P11.05 billion at the end of 2024 to P10.26 billion by September 2025, mainly due to a dramatic drop in cash, from P1.49 billion to just P152 million, a 90 percent collapse.

This plunge reflects shrinking sales and continued operating losses, as well as debt repayments that reduced loan balances but consumed nearly all of the company’s cash reserves.

While current liabilities have eased slightly, the quality of AllDY’s current assets has deteriorated because most of its resources are now tied up in inventories and prepayments rather than liquid funds. The company still posted a strong current ratio of 2.39x, but this is overstated, as only a small portion of those assets can be used immediately to support daily operations.

Despite these challenges, AllDY remains financially stable from a solvency standpoint. Total liabilities declined from P3.95 billion to P3.25 billion, and equity remained high at P7.01 billion, indicating that losses have not yet eroded the company’s capital base.

If sales do not recover and cash continues to decline, the company may face working-capital pressure or the need to borrow again. Without a turnaround in sales or a strengthening of cash flow, the company could face more serious liquidity problems in the next few quarters.

AllDy’s valuations paint a mixed picture that reflects both opportunity and risk. On the surface, the stock appears cheap, with a current P/E of 3.16 and a price-to-sales ratio of only 0.33, which suggests that the market is heavily discounting the company relative to its revenue base.

The price-to-book ratio of 0.43 further indicates that the market values AllDay at less than half of its net asset value, a sign that investors have very low confidence in the company’s future earnings.

These low multiples must be interpreted carefully, because they reflect a business currently facing sharp revenue declines and shrinking cash flow, not an undervalued but healthy company.

Profitability metrics reinforce the narrative of a company under pressure. Returns are equally modest: ROA is 2.60 percent, ROE 3.82 percent, and ROIC 3.45 percent, all well below the cost of capital typically required to sustain long-term growth. These weak returns indicate that the business is currently earning too little relative to its asset and equity base, which is a warning sign for long-term investors.

The capitalization ratios show that AllDy is not heavily leveraged, with total debt-to-equity at 43.5 percent and long-term debt-to-equity at only 13.77 percent, which suggest that solvency is not a problem. However, the issue is not solvency but liquidity and declining profitability, which could become more problematic if sales fail to recover.

Despite AllDy’s extremely low valuation ratios such as a P/E of 3.16, a price-to-book of 0.43, and EV/EBITDA of 2.67, the stock does not present a clean speculative buying opportunity at this stage. Falling profitability means the low P/E is not a sign of undervaluation, but a reflection of deteriorating earnings and heightened risk.

For a speculative investor, the only bullish argument is that the stock is priced at distressed levels, which leaves potential upside if the company stages a turnaround. However, there are no clear signs yet of a recovery, and the liquidity trend is moving in the wrong direction. Supermarket chains also have low margins and high fixed costs, making turnarounds slow and difficult.

Price: 0.85  

Year to date loss – 70.18 percent

DFNN, Inc. (PSE: DFNN) is a Philippine technology company specializing in secure financial-transaction platforms, systems integration, and digital gaming solutions. It is one of the country’s leading developers of electronic gaming systems licensed by PAGCOR, and a provider of enterprise technology services to banks, corporations, and government agencies.

DFNN operates across four core businesses: systems integration, software development, technology consulting, and gaming platform development. Through its gaming subsidiaries, the company operates licensed platforms such as InPlay, InstaWin, and XchangeBet, and provides backend technology for electronic gaming machines, digit games, and sports betting exchange.

Last year, DFNN posted a sharp drop in service revenues, falling 40.5 percent to P584.23 million from P981.29 million in 2023, driven by intense competition in remote gaming platforms and weaker contributions from gaming-related subsidiaries.

This revenue decline, combined with higher costs tied to the launch of LottoMatik and legacy write-offs, pushed the company into a much deeper net loss of P652.58 million, a deterioration of 305 percent from the P161.40 million loss in 2023. The revenue contraction and rising expenses resulted in negative earnings and a capital deficiency by year-end.

This year, DFNN posted a sharp revenue contraction in the first nine months of 2025, with total revenues falling 56.5 percent to P205.9 million from P473.0 million in the same period last year. The biggest drag was the 72.6 percent collapse in commission income (P72.5 million vs. P264.8 million), after major e-wallet providers removed payment links to online gaming platforms—severely disrupting the InPlay business.

Despite the steep revenue decline, DFNN managed to narrow its net loss slightly to P384.7 million, an improvement from last year’s P423.5 million loss, largely due to cost reductions across service fees, logistics, travel, and personnel expenses.

DFNN’s latest financial position shows that it is under severe strain, with its balance sheet deteriorating further in the first nine months of 2025. Total assets slipped from P1.73 billion at the end of 2024 to P1.59 billion by September 2025. This contraction would already be concerning, but it is outweighed by the rapid rise in liabilities.

Current liabilities ballooned to P1.92 billion, more than double the company’s current assets of only P824 million, which leaves DFNN with a current ratio of 0.43x, far below the level required to meet short-term obligations.

Adding to these pressures is the worsening capital deficiency. DFNN’s equity deficit widened from P273 million in 2024 to P630 million in 2025, driven by another P374 million net loss during the period and large accumulated deficits from previous years.

Given DFNN’s current financial position, the stock is best to avoid for now, even for speculative investors. The company is operating under very high financial stress where revenues have collapsed, losses remain large, and DFNN now carries a widening capital deficiency.

This severe mismatch creates a real risk of payment delays, creditor pressure, or the need for emergency financing to keep operations running.

While DFNN has long-term potential in gaming technology, AI, and digital platforms, none of these future opportunities can offset the immediate financial risks. The company needs a major capital infusion or a dramatic turnaround in revenues before investor risk becomes manageable.

Until clear evidence of stabilization emerges, such as improved cash flow, reduced payables, or a narrowed capital deficit, the stock carries far more downside than upside potential.

Price: 0.69 

Year to date loss -57.9 percent

DITO CME Holdings Corp. (PSE: DITO) is the controlling shareholder of DITO Telecommunity, the Philippines’ third major telecommunications player. The company is focused on delivering nationwide mobile connectivity through a modern all-IP 4G and 5G network built to compete directly with Globe and Smart.

DITO Telecommunity derives the bulk of its revenues from mobile data and voice services, supported by its growing nationwide tower network and expanding fiber backbone.

The business is driven primarily by prepaid mobile subscriptions and high-speed data usage, with additional revenues coming from digital services, international roaming, and interconnection fees. DITO CME also holds minority interests in media, fintech, and digital lifestyle platforms that complement its telecommunications operations.

In 2024, DITO posted strong topline growth as consolidated revenues rose to P34.52 billion, up sharply from P27.29 billion in 2023, driven primarily by the expansion of DITO Telecommunity’s mobile subscriber base and higher data usage.

However, despite the revenue increase, the company remained unprofitable. DITO recorded a net loss of P18.68 billion for the year, a deeper loss compared to P17.74 billion in 2023, due to the high operating and financing costs associated with building out a nationwide 4G/5G telecommunications network.

This year, DITO’s top line improved in the first nine months of 2025 as consolidated revenues rose 25.5 percent to P14.92 billion from P11.89 billion last year, driven mainly by stronger service revenues as the telco expanded its subscriber base.

However, despite the revenue growth, the company remained deeply loss-making. Total costs and expenses ballooned to P24.65 billion, while interest expense alone amounted to P12.82 billion. As a result, net loss remained massive at P24.93 billion, only slightly lower than the P25.86-billion loss in 9M 2024.

DITO’s latest financial position reveals that it is still under intense financial strain despite growing revenues. Total assets declined to P209.3 billion as of September 2025. Yet even as assets shrank, total liabilities continued to rise, reaching P304.6 billion, driven largely by heavy long-term borrowings used to fund the expansion of its 4G and 5G network.

This imbalance has pushed the company’s capital deficiency deeper, widening from P73.4 billion at the end of 2024 to a staggering P95.3 billion by the third quarter of 2025. In simple terms, DITO owes far more than the value of its assets, and its equity is deeply negative.

The structure of DITO’s liabilities adds further pressure. Current liabilities surged to P96.1 billion, while current assets stood at only about P6.1 billion, indicating very weak short-term liquidity and a significant mismatch between obligations falling due and available resources.

Despite ongoing efforts to grow its subscriber base and improve network efficiency, DITO continues to incur massive losses. These losses, along with high depreciation charges and substantial interest expenses, further erode the balance sheet.

Until DITO secures significant new funding and meaningfully reduces its capital deficiency and debt burden, its balance sheet will remain fragile, and the company will continue to face elevated financial and operational risks.

Henry Ong, RFP, is an entrepreneur, financial planning advocate and business advisor. Email Henry for business advice [email protected] or follow him on Twitter @henryong888