Opinion: The Case for Shared Responsibility on Disinformation
As one veteran reporter bluntly puts it: “If it is news, it isn’t fake. And if it’s false, then it cannot be news.”
Published on Aug 25, 2026
In a press briefing, Presidential Communications Office Undersecretary Claire Castro lamented: 'Medyo ang bansa natin talaga ay bugbog na bugbog na sa fake news.' Firstly, the use of the term 'fake news' is not helpful. As one veteran reporter bluntly puts it: "If it is news, it isn't fake. And if it's false, then it cannot be news." Obviously, the term 'fake news' is an oxymoron and thus inappropriate for use in serious discussions, particularly those aimed at finding solutions to this dire problem.
Disinformation is currently treated, specifically by our government, as a problem of false content. Under this approach, the task appears relatively straightforward: identify falsehoods, remove them, punish those responsible, and prevent their further circulation. But this approach misunderstands the nature of contemporary disinformation. The more fundamental problem is the process through which falsehood is deliberately produced, disseminated, amplified, monetized, and converted into political, economic, or social harm.
A more effective approach to countering disinformation is therefore to understand it through a number of interrelated variables. These variables identify the principal actors and institutions that make up the contemporary information ecosystem and the different responsibilities they carry. They include the purveyors of disinformation, digital platforms, governments, civil society, and the ordinary users of digital communication technologies. Each variable contributes to either the production and persistence of disinformation or to the protection of the information ecosystem.
First, purveyors of disinformation are the individuals, organizations, political actors, commercial enterprises, and networks that deliberately create or distribute deceptive information. Their motivations vary. Some seek financial gain by generating sensational or emotionally provocative content that attracts attention, advertising revenue, and online engagement. Others seek political influence, whether by promoting candidates, attacking opponents, shaping public opinion, or manipulating electoral behavior.
Thus, a regulatory approach must target deliberate deception, coordinated manipulation, and harmful information operations. Where disinformation is organized as a business model or political strategy, it may be necessary to address not only individual pieces of content but also the networks, financing structures, and incentives that sustain the operation. Otherwise, removing one false post simply allows the same actors to produce another.
Second, digital platforms, such as Facebook, X, TikTok, and YouTube, have become the principal infrastructure through which contemporary public communication takes place. Increasingly, political debate, news consumption, civic mobilization, and public discourse occur within digital platforms. The 'platformization' of civic life means that the decisions made by platform companies increasingly affect the quality and integrity of democratic communication.
Platforms also benefit economically from user attention and engagement. Content that provokes outrage, fear, or intense emotional reactions can generate interaction and therefore commercial value. While platforms do not necessarily create the disinformation circulating through their systems, their architecture, algorithms, and business models may contribute to its visibility and amplification. This creates a legitimate basis for imposing a form of 'digital duty of care.'
A digital duty of care standard does not require platforms to determine the truth or falsity of every statement made by users. Nor should it transform platforms into instruments of government censorship. Instead, it recognizes that entities that control major communication infrastructures have responsibilities proportionate to their power and social significance. Platforms may therefore be required to assess systemic risks, address coordinated manipulation, provide greater transparency regarding algorithmic amplification and political advertising, and develop mechanisms for reducing foreseeable harms.
Third, government has a constitutional and democratic responsibility to protect individuals and society from harm. In the digital environment, this responsibility includes protecting citizens against serious forms of manipulation and machinations that may undermine their ability to participate meaningfully in democratic life. Government cannot simply stand aside when powerful actors systematically exploit information infrastructures to deceive citizens, undermine elections, or damage social cohesion.
However, the government's duty to protect creates a corresponding danger: the suppression of free speech. The government must therefore be both an active protector of the information ecosystem and a restrained regulator of speech. Its interventions must comply with constitutional principles, particularly legality, necessity, and proportionality. Vague laws giving government officials broad authority to determine what constitutes truth are especially perilous.
Fourth, civil society has an important duty of care toward the broader information ecosystem. Historically, professional media performed a gatekeeping function. Editors, journalists, and media institutions acted, at least in principle, as intermediaries who applied professional standards before information reached a mass audience. The digital environment has weakened this traditional gatekeeping mandate by allowing almost anyone to become a publisher with immediate access to potentially vast audiences.
This does not mean that the role of civil society has disappeared. On the contrary, it has become more important. Independent and principled journalism provides verification, investigation, and context. Bona fide fact-checking organizations can expose false claims and provide citizens with reliable information. Fact-checking is particularly important as a form of counter-speech. Rather than relying exclusively on the removal or suppression of speech, counter-speech responds to falsehood with evidence, correction, and competing information.
Fifth, there is the netizen, whose contribution is often dismissed in disinformation discourse. Freedom of expression is a fundamental right, but participation in the digital public sphere also carries responsibilities. Social media gives individuals a communicative power that was previously available primarily to governments, media institutions, and wealthy organizations. An ordinary user can now reach thousands or even millions of people. That power can be used to contribute to democratic discussion, but it can also be used to spread hatred, deception, and division.
Netizens should therefore take on the concomitant civic responsibility in exercising this power. This does not mean that individual users should be legally liable for every mistaken statement or discouraged from participating in political debate. Democratic discourse necessarily includes disagreement, error, satire, hyperbole, and unpopular opinions. The responsibility arises where people knowingly participate in the circulation of harmful deception or use digital platforms to deliberately undermine social cohesion and harm others.
Taken together, these five variables demonstrate that countering disinformation is a problem of shared but differentiated responsibility. Purveyors must be held accountable for deliberate deception and coordinated manipulation. Platforms must exercise a digital duty of care consistent with their role as critical infrastructures of civic life. Government must protect citizens and democratic institutions while remaining constrained by constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression. Civil society must continue to provide independent scrutiny, verification, and counter-speech. Netizens, finally, must accept that the exercise of free speech carries civic responsibilities within a shared information environment.
This framework offers an alternative to the simplistic choice between censorship and inaction. No single stakeholder of the information ecosystem can solve the problem of disinformation. But each has a role in ensuring that the digital public sphere remains a marketplace of ideas where creativity and expression can flourish without being systematically infiltrated by parties with the intent to deceive and destroy the social cohesion on which democracy ultimately depends.
Michael Henry Ll. Yusingco is a constitutionalist, law lecturer, and a senior research fellow of the Ateneo Policy Center.
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